A recent column, “ Dear Editor, I Disagree: Dialogue at BRICS is a means, not an end ” (IE, September 16), argued for testing the usefulness of multilateral forums such as BRICS on the tangible outcomes they produce and not by the agency they provide for dialogue and diplomacy. The argument falls short, especially in the context of developments surrounding the West Asia war at BRICS 2026. Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) used the occasion for their first High-level bilateral meeting since the war began. Since the initiation of a dialogue cannot be expected to produce immediate settlements, its value cannot be judged by the ends it may ultimately achieve. The significance of the declaration on West Asia lies not only in what it says, but in the fact that there was a declaration at all. In such conflict, the floor provided by BRICS 2026 represents that a means can be an outcome. A section of the analysts have compared the BRICS New Delhi Declaration 2026 with the Rio BRICS Declaration 2025. The Rio declaration condemned the military strikes against Iran as a violation of international law and the UN Charter. By the plain measure of textual strength, the Delhi Declaration might seem to be a retreat. Yet, read carefully, the weaker sentence is the more significant achievement, and the reason lies in what changed between the two summits. In June 2025, Iran was a member of BRICS that had been attacked. Every other member could condemn the Attack without contradicting its own position. By February 2026, when the US and Israel struck again, Iran had responded by striking targets across the Gulf, including the territory of its fellow members. The UAE has absorbed more Iranian projectiles than any other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state, and subsequently suspended trade and financial dealings with Tehran. The condemnation formula available in Rio was not available in New Delhi, not because the chair lacked resolve but because the members had become belligerents against one another. The measure of the Delhi outcome cannot, therefore, be Rio. In May 2026, BRICS foreign ministers met in New Delhi and produced nothing at all. In March, the External Affairs Ministry had publicly conceded the difficulty, noting that members were directly involved in the conflict and that India, as chair, was working the Sherpa channel to narrow differences. Four months after the ministerial failure, 11 members adopted a declaration by consensus. Where they agreed, the language stayed precise, reiterating the importance of the Palestinian question and the two-state solution. Where they disagreed, the language built a floor instead of delivering a verdict. The diplomatic capital visible at BRICS did not arise in 2026. It has been accumulated over a decade in which the Modi government has altered both the political grammar and structure of India’s engagement with the Gulf — a shift from traditional oil and trade to more strategic spheres of defence, technology, and security. Most consequentially, the Modi years have demonstrated that India’s relationships in West Asia need not be organised as mutually exclusive choices. BRICS 2026 allowed India to position itself as a state capable of understanding the security anxieties of the Arab Gulf without treating Iran’s isolation as an objective, and capable of engaging Iran without appearing indifferent to Gulf security. Relationships cultivated across binaries can themselves become diplomatic assets. Strategic autonomy does more than create manoeuvring room for India; it can create diplomatic room between others. Despite the diplomatic dividends for India at the summit, there are limits to what this means. A summit declaration does not make India a direct mediator in West Asia. Formal mediation requires acceptance by the parties, a mandate and a negotiating agenda. What Delhi can instead offer is more specific and valuable — trusted channels especially when they are scarce, political access across opposing capitals, and the ability to enlarge the space for accommodation without demanding geopolitical allegiance. The writer is a former vice-chancellor, Aligarh Muslim University and nominated Member of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Council
